Part-01

Introduction
Some Gloomy Facts about Korean Elderly

HRS (Health and Retirement Study)
• 7,607 U.S. households (12,652 persons aged 51-61) in 1992
• Financial help given to and received from children/parents has been reported. • If T=ps (p: implicit price of service), then ∂s/∂I r <0 and ∂p/∂I r >0.
Part-02
Patterns of Transfers
-If altruism dominates, public transfers will crowd out private transfers. -Empirical literature comes to mixed conclusions.
Which Parents Benefits More from Children?
Sum of net annual transfer from every child (10,000 won) • Expected benefit-cost ratio for average pensioner = 1.8
 We Exploit Next Generations?
- (  Findings -Altruism is the main motive of familial transfers in Korea.
-Public transfer (expectation) crowds out private transfer.
-Eldest sons undertake the heaviest burden for parents.
-Child education can hardly be a retirement plan.
-Familial support mechanism has been deteriorating.
 Suggestions
-Prepare yourself for retirement! (Don't count on your child!) -Make child education less burdensome to keep nest eggs.
-Extend employment opportunities for the elderly.
-Enhance long-term saving incentives and reform pensions.
-Encourage the liquidation of residential home for income.
-Target disadvantaged groups giving priority to reducing poverty prevalent among the elderly.
